Windows IOCTL reference. Ioctl. Hex Value. Header. Brief. IOCTL1. CLASS0x. 22. 02. 1dincddk1. An IEEE 1. 39. 4 driver uses the IRPMJDEVICECONTROL IRP, with. Io. Control. Code. IOCTL1. 39. 4CLASS, to communicate with the bus driver. The driver has access to all operations provided by the IEEE 1. IOCTL1. 39. 4TOGGLEENUMTESTOFF0x. IOCTL1. 39. 4TOGGLEENUMTESTON0x. IOCTL6. 18. 83CLASS0x. An IEC 6. 18. 83 client driver uses the. IRPMJINTERNALDEVICECONTROLIRP with. Io. Control. Code. IOCTL6. 18. 83CLASS to communicate with 1. IEC 6. 18. 83 protocol. The driver has access to all operations provided by the IEC 6. IOCTLAACSENDSESSION0x. Description NetworkLatencyView is a simple tool for Windows that listens to the TCP connections on your system and calculates the network latency in milliseconds. Releases the Authentication Grant Identifier AGID that was obtained by. IOCTLAACSSTARTSESSION. IOCTLAACSGENERATEBINDINGNONCE0x. Reads the Advanced Access Content System AACS binding nonce starting at the specified byte offset on the disc, as part of the protocol for writing to a protected data area. IOCTLAACSGETCERTIFICATE0x. Queries the logical unit for the device certificate. IOCTLAACSGETCHALLENGEKEY0x. Queries the logical unit for the devices challenge key. The challenge key consists of a point on an elliptic curve and its associated signature. IOCTLAACSREADBINDINGNONCE0x. Reads the Advanced Access Content System AACS binding nonce starting at the specified byte offset on the disc, as part of the protocol for reading a protected data area. IOCTLAACSREADMEDIAID0x. Reads the Advanced Access Content System AACS specific media identifier data. IOCTLAACSREADMEDIAKEYBLOCK0x. Queries the logical unit for the Media Key Block MKB. Version. version used. The compiler version used for this sheet. show version. How to get the compiler version. implicit prologue. Code which examples in the sheet. Lower the Audio from Other Programs While JAWS is Speaking. In Windows 8 and later, you can now specify that the volume of audio from other programs be lowered while. IOCTLAACSREADMEDIAKEYBLOCKSIZE0x. Queries the logical unit for the size of the buffer that is required to hold the Advanced Access Control System AACS Media Key Block MKB. IOCTLAACSREADSERIALNUMBER0x. Reads the Advanced Access Content System AACS specific prerecorded media serial number. IOCTLAACSREADVOLUMEID0x. Reads the Advanced Access Content System AACS specific volume identifier. IOCTLAACSSENDCERTIFICATE0x. Sends the host certificate to the logical unit. IOCTLAACSSENDCHALLENGEKEY0x. Sends the hosts challenge key to the logical unit. The hosts challenge key consists of a point on an elliptic curve and its associated signature. IOCTLAACSSTARTSESSION0x. Retrieves an Authentication Grant Identifier AGID that identifies a secure session. IOCTLABORTPIPE0x. IOCTLACPIACQUIREGLOBALLOCK0x. The IOCTLACPIACQUIREGLOBALLOCK device control request is reserved for internal use only. IOCTLACPIASYNCEVALMETHOD0x. A driver for a device can use the IOCTLACPIASYNCEVALMETHOD device control request to asynchronously evaluate an ACPI control method that is supported by the device. The driver should call. Io. Build. Device. Io. Control. Requestand pass the following input and output parameters to build this request. IOCTLACPIASYNCEVALMETHODEX0x. A driver for a device can use the IOCTLACPIEVALMETHOD device control request to synchronously evaluate an ACPI control method that is supported by the device. The driver should call. Io. Build. Device. Io. Control. Requestand pass the following input and output parameters to build this request. IOCTLACPIENUMCHILDREN0x. The IOCTLACPIENUMCHILDREN device control request can be used to enumerate the path and name of devices or named child objects in the ACPI namespace of the device to which this request is sent. A driver should call. Io. Build. Device. Io. Control. Requestand pass the following input and output parameters to build this request. IOCTLACPIEVALMETHOD0x. A driver for a device can use the IOCTLACPIEVALMETHOD device control request to synchronously evaluate an ACPI control method that is supported by the device. The driver should call. Io. Build. Device. Io. Control. Requestand pass the following input and output parameters to build this request. IOCTLACPIEVALMETHODEX0x. A driver for a device can use the IOCTLACPIEVALMETHODEX device control request to synchronously evaluate an ACPI control method that is supported by a child device in the namespace of the device. The driver should call. Io. Build. Device. Io. Control. Requestand pass the following input and output parameters to build this request. IOCTLACPIRELEASEGLOBALLOCK0x. The IOCTLACPIRELEASEGLOBALLOCK device control request is reserved for internal use only. IOCTLARPSENDREQUEST0x. IOCTLATAMINIPORT0x. IOCTLATAPASSTHROUGH0x. Allows an application to send almost any ATA command to a target device, with the following restrictions IOCTLATAPASSTHROUGHDIRECT0x. Allows an application to send almost any ATA command to a target device, with the following restrictions IOCTLAVCSTRMCLASS0x. An AVC subunit driver uses the. IRPMJINTERNALDEVICECONTROLIRP, with the. Io. Control. Codemember set to IOCTLAVCSTRMCLASS, to communicate withavcstrm. The driver has access to all operations provided by the AVC Streaming filter driver avcstrm. IOCTLAVCBUSRESET0x. The IOCTLAVCBUSRESET IO control code allows the caller to complete any previous IOCTLAVCUPDATEVIRTUALSUBUNITINFO and IOCTLAVCREMOVEVIRTUALSUBUNITINFO control requests that did not use the AVCSUBUNITADDRTRIGGERBUSRESET flag. It is available to user mode as well as kernel mode components through the IRPMJDEVICECONTROL dispatch. IOCTLAVCCLASS0x. The IOCTLAVCCLASS IO control code is supported only from kernel mode, using the IRPMJINTERNALDEVICECONTROL dispatch. IOCTLAVCREMOVEVIRTUALSUBUNITINFO0x. The IOCTLAVCREMOVEVIRTUALSUBUNITINFO IO control code controls the enumeration of virtual subunits. It is available to user mode as well as kernel mode components through the IRPMJDEVICECONTROL dispatch. For driver to driver communication, it is a METHODBUFFERED IOCTL, so set the IRP fields accordingly Irp. Stack Parameters. Device. Io. Control. Input. Buffer. Length and Irp Associated. Irp. System. Buffer. IOCTLAVCUPDATEVIRTUALSUBUNITINFO0x. The IOCTLAVCUPDATEVIRTUALSUBUNITINFO IO control code controls the enumeration of virtual subunits. It is available to user mode as well as kernel mode components through the IRPMJDEVICECONTROL dispatch. For driver to driver communication, it is a METHODBUFFERED IOCTL, so set the IRP fields accordingly Irp. Stack Parameters. Device. Io. Control. Input. Buffer. Length and Irp Associated. Irp. System. Buffer. IOCTLAVIOALLOCATESTREAM0xff. IOCTLAVIOFREESTREAM0xff. IOCTLAVIOMODIFYSTREAM0xff. IOCTLBATTERYQUERYINFORMATION0x. Retrieves a variety of information for the battery. IOCTLBATTERYQUERYSTATUS0x. Retrieves the current status of the battery. IOCTLBATTERYQUERYTAG0x. Retrieves the batterys current tag. IOCTLBATTERYSETINFORMATION0x. Sets various battery information. The input parameter structure,BATTERYSETINFORMATION, indicates which battery status information is to be set. IOCTLBEEPSET0x. IOCTLBIOMETRICCALIBRATE0x. The IOCTLBIOMETRICCALIBRATE IOCTL directs the driver to perform any necessary steps to calibrate the device for use. Internally, the driver may also collect and return vendor specific calibration data to be analyzed by an application. Vendor supplied WBDI drivers must support this IOCTL. IOCTLBIOMETRICCAPTUREDATA0x. The IOCTLBIOMETRICCAPTUREDATA IOCTL directs the driver to retrieve the next scan of biometric data. This call should put the device into capture mode. IOCTLBIOMETRICGETATTRIBUTES0x. The IOCTLBIOMETRICGETATTRIBUTES IOCTL returns a structure that contains a set of attributes for the sensor. Vendor supplied WBDI drivers must support this IOCTL. IOCTLBIOMETRICGETINDICATOR0x. The IOCTLBIOMETRICGETINDICATOR IOCTL directs the driver to retrieve the status of the indicator light. This IOCTL is optional. IOCTLBIOMETRICGETSENSORSTATUS0x. The IOCTLBIOMETRICGETSENSORSTATUS IOCTL tells the driver to perform any necessary steps to collect the current operating status of the device. Vendor supplied WBDI drivers must support this IOCTL. IOCTLBIOMETRICGETSUPPORTEDALGORITHMS0x. The IOCTLBIOMETRICGETSUPPORTEDALGORITHMS IOCTL retrieves a list of cryptographic hash algorithms that are supported by the device. This IOCTL is optional. IOCTLBIOMETRICRESET0x. The IOCTLBIOMETRICRESET IOCTL resets the device to a known or idle state, according to the current power state. Vendor supplied WBDI drivers must support this IOCTL. IOCTLBIOMETRICSETINDICATOR0x. The First Few Milliseconds of an HTTPS Connection. Convinced from spending hours reading rave reviews, Bob eagerly clicked Proceed to Checkout for his gallon of Tuscan Whole Milk andWhoa What just happened In the 2. 20 milliseconds that flew by, a lot of interesting stuff happened to make Firefox change the address bar color and put a lock in the lower right corner. With the help of Wireshark, my favorite network tool, and a slightly modified debug build of Firefox, we can see exactly whats going on. By agreement of RFC 2. Firefox knew that https meant it should connect to port 4. Amazon. com Most people associate HTTPS with SSL Secure Sockets Layer which was created by Netscape in the mid 9. This is becoming less true over time. As Netscape lost market share, SSLs maintenance moved to the Internet Engineering Task Force IETF. The first post Netscape version was re branded as Transport Layer Security TLS 1. January 1. 99. 9. Its rare to see true SSL traffic given that TLS has been around for 1. Client Hello. TLS wraps all traffic in records of different types. We see that the first byte out of our browser is the hex byte 0x. The next two bytes are 0x. TLS 1. 0 is essentially SSL 3. The handshake record is broken out into several messages. The first is our Client Hello message 0x. There are a few important things here Server Hello. Amazon. com replies with a handshake record thats a massive two packets in size 2,5. The record has version bytes of 0x. Amazon agreed to our request to use TLS 1. This record has three sub messages with some interesting data Server Hello Message 2 We get the servers four byte time Unix epoch time representation and its 2. A 3. 2 byte session ID in case we want to reconnect without a big handshake. Of the 3. 4 cipher suites we offered, Amazon picked TLSRSAWITHRC41. MD5 0x. 00. 04. This means that it will use the RSA public key algorithm to verify certificate signatures and exchange keys, the RC4 encryption algorithm to encrypt data, and the MD5 hash function to verify the contents of messages. Well cover these in depth later on. I personally think Amazon had selfish reasons for choosing this cipher suite. Of the ones on the list, it was the one that was least CPU intensive to use so that Amazon could crowd more connections onto each of their servers. A much less likely possibility is that they wanted to pay special tribute to Ron Rivest, who created all three of these algorithms. Certificate Message 1. Server Hello Done Message 1. This is a zero byte message that tells the client that its done with the Hello process and indicate that the server wont be asking the client for a certificate. Checking out the Certificate. The browser has to figure out if it should trust Amazon. In this case, its using certificates. It looks at Amazons certificate and sees that the current time is between the not before time of August 2. August 2. 7, 2. 00. It also checks to make sure that the certificates public key is authorized for exchanging secret keys. Why should we trust this certificate Attached to the certificate is a signature that is just a really long number in big endian format Anyone could have sent us these bytes. Why should we trust this signature To answer that question, need to make a speedy detour into mathemagic land Interlude A Short, Not Too Scary, Guide to RSAPeople sometimes wonder if math has any relevance to programming. Certificates give a very practical example of applied math. Amazons certificate tells us that we should use the RSA algorithm to check the signature. RSA was created in the 1. MIT professors Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman who found a clever way to combine ideas spanning 2. You pick two huge prime numbers p and q. Multiply them to get n pq. Next, you pick a small public exponent e which is the encryption exponent and a specially crafted inverse of e called d as the decryption exponent. You then make n and e public and keep d as secret as you possibly can and then throw away p and q or keep them as secret as d. Its really important to remember that e and d are inverses of each other. Now, if you have some message, you just need to interpret its bytes as a number M. If you want to encrypt a message to create a ciphertext, youd calculate C Me mod nThis means that you multiply M by itself e times. The mod n means that we only take the remainder e. For example, 1. 1 AM 3 hours 2 PM mod 1. The recipient knows d which allows them to invert the message to recover the original message Cd Med Me M1 M mod nJust as interesting is that the person with d can sign a document by raising a message M to the d exponent Md S mod nThis works because signer makes public S, M, e, and n. Anyone can verify the signature S with a simple calculation Se Mde Md Me M1 M mod nPublic key cryptography algorithms like RSA are often called asymmetric algorithms because the encryption key in our case, e is not equal to e. Reducing everything mod n makes it impossible to use the easy techniques that were used to such as normal logarithms. The magic of RSA works because you can calculateencrypt C Me mod n very quickly, but it is really hard to calculatedecrypt Cd M mod n without knowing d. As we saw earlier, d is derived from factoring n back to its p and q, which is a tough problem. Verifying Signatures. The big thing to keep in mind with RSA in the real world is that all of the numbers involved have to be big to make things really hard to break using the best algorithms that we have. How big Amazon. coms certificate was signed by Veri. Sign Class 3 Secure Server CA. From the certificate, we see that this Veri. Sign modulus n is 2. Good luck trying to find p and q from this n if you could, you could generate real looking Veri. Sign certificates. Veri. Signs e is 2. 16 1 6. Of course, they keep their d value secret, probably on a safe hardware device protected by retinal scanners and armed guards. Before signing, Veri. Sign checked the validity of the contents that Amazon. Once Veri. Sign was satisfied with the documents, they used the SHA 1 hash algorithm to get a hash value of the certificate that had all the claims. In Wireshark, the full certificate shows up as the signed. Certificate part Its sort of a misnomer since it actually means that those are the bytes that the signer is going to sign and not the bytes that already include a signature. The actual signature, S, is simply called encrypted in Wireshark. If we raise S to Veri. Signs public e exponent of 6. FFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF. FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF. FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF. FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF. FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF. FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF. FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF. FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF. FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF. FFFFFFFF0. 03. 02. B0. E0. 30. 21. A 0. C1. 9F8. 78. 6. 8. C6. 0EFE0. 54. 2 E4. C2. 16. 7C8. 30. 53. DB. Per the PKCS 1 v. The second byte of 0. This is followed by a lot of FF bytes that are used to pad the result to make sure that its big enough. The padding is terminated by a 0. Its followed by 3. B 0. E 0. 3 0. 2 1. A 0. 5 0. 0 0. 4 1. PKCS 1 v. 2. 1 way of specifying the SHA 1 hash algorithm. The last 2. 0 bytes are SHA 1 hash digest of the bytes in signed. Certificate. Since the decrypted value is properly formatted and the last bytes are the same hash value that we can calculate independently, we can assume that whoever knew Veri. Sign Class 3 Secure Server CAs private key signed it. We implicitly trust that only Veri. Sign knows the private key d. We can repeat the process to verify that Veri. Sign Class 3 Secure Server CAs certificate was signed by Veri. Signs Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority. But why should we trust that There are no more levels on the trust chain. The top Veri. Sign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority was signed by itself. This certificate has been built into Mozilla products as an implicitly trusted good certificate since version 1. Network Security Services NSS library. It was checked in on September 6, 2.
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